Abstract. We identify and fill some gaps with regard to consistency (the extent to which false positives are produced) for public-key encryption with keyword search (PEKS). We define computational and statistical relaxations of the existing notion of perfect consistency, show that the scheme of Boneh et al. (Advances in Cryptology-EUROCRYPT 2004, ed. by C. Cachin, J. Camenisch, pp. 506-522, 2004) is computationally consistent, and provide a new scheme that is statistically consistent. We also provide a transform of an anonymous identity-based encryption (IBE) scheme to a secure PEKS scheme that, unlike the previous one, guarantees consistency. Finally, we suggest three extensions of the basic notions considered here, namely anonymous hierarchical identity-based encryption, public-key encryption with temporary keyword search, and identity-based encryption with keyword search.
Introduction
There has recently been interest in various forms of "searchable encryption" [8, 16, 18, 24, 26] . In this paper, we further explore one of the variants of this goal, namely publickey encryption with keyword search (PEKS) as introduced by Boneh, Di Crescenzo, Ostrovsky and Persiano [8] .
The killer application envisaged by Boneh et al. is that of intelligent email routing. We consider emails as consisting of some header information, a body, and a list of keywords. Imagine Alice uses different electronic devices to read her email, including a pager, a PDA, and a desktop computer. Alice may prefer emails to be routed to her devices depending on the associated keywords. For example, she may like to receive emails with the keyword "urgent" on her pager, emails with the keyword "agenda" on her PDA, and all other emails on her desktop computer.
Existing mail server software could be updated to provide this type of service for plain, unencrypted email. When Bob sends an email to Alice encrypted under her public key, however, routing becomes much harder. One option would be for Bob to leave the list of keywords unencrypted; if Bob is a colleague of Alice however, he may not like the gateway to know that he is exchanging emails with her with the keyword "personal". Alice is probably not willing to hand her decryption key to the gateway either. Rather, she would like to give the gateway some piece of trapdoor information that allows it to test whether the keyword "urgent" is among those in the list, without revealing any other information about the email to the gateway. This is exactly the type of functionality provided by a PEKS scheme. Bob can then use a standard public-key encryption scheme to encrypt the body of the email, and a PEKS scheme to separately encrypt each of the keywords.
The routing configuration of the email gateway need not be static. Alternatively, Alice could send the trapdoors for the keywords that she wants to receive at the time of login. This could be useful for checking email over a low-bandwidth connection: when Alice is at a conference, for example, she may want to download to her laptop only those emails tagged with keyword "urgent".
As another application, Waters et al. [26] show how PEKS schemes can be used to let an untrusted logging device maintain an encrypted audit log of privacy-sensitive data (e.g. user actions on a computer system) that is efficiently searchable by authorized auditors only. The entries in the audit log are encrypted under the public key of a PEKS scheme, of which the corresponding secret key is unknown to the logging device. If the device is ever confiscated, or if the logbook leaks, privacy of users and their actions is maintained. The secret key is known only to a trusted audit escrow agent, who provides (less trusted) authorized investigators with trapdoors for the keywords they want to search for.
In this paper, we investigate some consistency-related issues and results of PEKS schemes, then consider the connection to anonymous identity-based encryption (IBE), and finally discuss some new extensions.
Consistency in PEKS
Any cryptographic primitive must meet two conditions. One is of course a security condition. The other, which we will here call a consistency condition, ensures that the primitive fulfills its function. For example, for public-key encryption, the security condition is privacy. (This could be formalized in many ways, e.g. IND-CPA or IND-CCA.) The consistency condition is that decryption reverses encryption, meaning that if M is encrypted under public key pk to result in ciphertext C, then decrypting C under the secret key corresponding to pk results in M being returned.
PEKS In a PEKS scheme, Alice can provide a gateway with a trapdoor t w (computed as a function of her secret key) for any keyword w of her choice. A sender encrypts a keyword w under Alice's public key pk to obtain a ciphertext C that is sent to the gateway. The latter can apply a test function Test to t w , C to get back 0 or 1. The consistency condition as per [8] is that if w = w then Test(t w , C) returns 1 and if w = w it returns 0. The security condition is that the gateway learn nothing about w beyond whether or not it equals w. (The corresponding formal notion will be denoted PEKS-IND-CPA.) The application setting is that C can be attached to an email (ordinarily encrypted for Alice under a different public key), allowing the gateway to route the email to different locations (e.g. Alice's desktop, laptop or pager) based on w while preserving privacy of the latter to the largest extent possible.
Consistency of BDOP -PEKS
It is easy to see (cf. Proposition 3.1) that the main construction of [8] (a random oracle (RO) model, bilinear Diffie-Hellman (BDH) based PEKS-IND-CPA secure PEKS scheme that we call BDOP -PEKS ) fails to meet the consistency condition defined in [8] and stated above. (Specifically, there are distinct keywords w, w such that Test(t w , C) = 1 for any C that encrypts w .) The potential problem this raises in practice is that email will be incorrectly routed.
New Notions of Consistency
It is natural to ask if BDOP -PEKS meets some consistency condition that is weaker than theirs but still adequate in practice. To answer this, we provide some new definitions. Somewhat unusually for a consistency condition, we formulate consistency more like a security condition, via an experiment involving an adversary. The difference is that this adversary is not very "adversarial": it is supposed to reflect some kind of worst case but not malicious behavior. However this turns out to be a difficult line to draw, definitionally, so that some subtle issues arise. One outcome of this approach is that it naturally gives rise to a hierarchy of notions of consistency, namely perfect, statistical and computational. The first asks that the advantage of any (even computationally unbounded) adversary be zero; the second that the advantage of any (even computationally unbounded) adversary be negligible; the third that the advantage of any polynomial-time adversary be negligible. We note that perfect consistency as per our definition coincides with consistency as per [8] , and so our notions can be viewed as natural weakenings of theirs.
An Analogy There is a natural notion of decryption error for encryption schemes [17, Sect. 5.1.2] . A perfectly consistent PEKS is the analog of an encryption scheme with zero decryption error (the usual requirement). A statistically consistent PEKS is the analog of an encryption scheme with negligible decryption error (a less common but still often used condition [2, 13] ). However, computational consistency is a non-standard relaxation, for consistency conditions are typically not computational. This is not because one cannot define them that way (one could certainly define a computational consistency requirement for encryption) but rather because there has never been any motivation to do so. What makes PEKS different, as emerges from the results below, is that computational consistency is relevant and arises naturally.
Consistency of BDOP -PEKS , Revisited
The counter-example (cf. Proposition 3. 1) showing that BDOP -PEKS is not perfectly consistent extends to show that it is not statistically consistent either. However, we show (cf. Theorem 3.3) that BDOP -PEKS is computationally consistent. In the random-oracle model, this is not under any computational assumption: the limitation on the running time of the adversary is relevant because it limits the number of queries the adversary can make to the random oracle. When the random oracle is instantiated via a hash function, we would need to assume collisionresistance of the hash function. The implication of this result is that BDOP -PEKS is probably fine to use in practice, in that incorrect routing of email, while possible in principle, is unlikely to actually happen.
A Statistically Consistent PEKS Scheme
We provide the first construction of a PEKS scheme that is statistically consistent. The scheme is in the random oracle model, and is also PEKS-IND-CPA secure assuming the BDH problem is hard. The motivation for the new scheme was largely theoretical. From a foundational perspective, we wanted to know whether PEKS was an anomaly in the sense that only computational consistency is possible, or whether, like other primitives, statistical consistency could be achieved. However, it is also true that while computational consistency is arguably enough in an application, statistical might be preferable because the guarantee is unconditional.
PEKS and Anonymous IBE
BDOP -PEKS is based on the Boneh-Franklin IBE (BF -IBE ) scheme [9] . It is natural to ask whether one might, more generally, build PEKS schemes from IBE schemes in some blackbox way. To this end, a transform of an IBE scheme into a PEKS scheme is suggested in [8] . Interestingly, they note that the property of the IBE scheme that appears necessary to provide PEKS-IND-CPA of the PEKS scheme is not the usual IBE-IND-CPA but rather anonymity. (An IBE scheme is anonymous if a ciphertext does not reveal the identity of the recipient [3] .) While [8] stops short of stating and proving a formal result here, it is not hard to verify that their intuition is correct. Namely one can show that if the starting IBE scheme IBE meets an appropriate formal notion of anonymity (IBE-ANO-CPA, cf. Section 4.1) then PEKS = ibe-2-peks(IBE ) is PEKS-IND-CPA, where ibe-2-peks denotes the transform suggested in [8] .
Consistency in ibe-2-peks Unfortunately, we show (cf. Theorem 4.1) that there are IBE schemes for which the PEKS scheme outputted by ibe-2-peks is not even computationally consistent. This means that ibe-2-peks is not in general a suitable way to turn an IBE scheme into a PEKS scheme. (Although it might be in some cases, and in particular is when the starting IBE scheme is BF -IBE, for in that case the resulting PEKS scheme is BDOP -PEKS .)
new-ibe-2-peks We propose a randomized variant of the ibe-2-peks transform that we call new-ibe-2-peks, and prove that if an IBE scheme IBE is IBE-ANO-CPA and IBE-IND-CPA then the PEKS scheme new-ibe-2-peks(IBE ) is PEKS-IND-CPA and computationally consistent (cf. Sect. 4.3). We do not know of a transform where the resulting PEKS scheme is statistically or perfectly consistent.
Anonymous IBE Schemes
The above motivates finding anonymous IBE schemes. Towards this, we begin by extending Halevi's condition for anonymity [19] to the IBE setting (cf. Sect. 4.4). Based on this, we are able to give a simple proof that the (randomoracle model) BF -IBE scheme [9] is IBE-ANO-CPA assuming the BDH problem is hard (cf. Theorem 4.4). (We clarify that a proof of this result is implicit in the proof of security of the BF -IBE based BDOP -PEKS scheme given in [8] . Our contribution is to have stated the formal definition of anonymity and provided a simpler proof via the extension of Halevi's condition.) Towards answering the question of whether there exist anonymous IBE schemes in the standard (as opposed to random oracle) model, we present in Appendix A.1 an attack to show that Water's IBE scheme [25] is not IBE-ANO-CPA.
Extensions
Anonymous HIBE We provide definitions of anonymity for hierarchical IBE (HIBE) schemes. Our definition can be parameterized by a level, so that we can talk of a HIBE that is anonymous at level l. We note that the HIBE schemes of [7, 15] are not anonymous, even at level 1. (That of [20] appears to be anonymous at both levels 1 and 2 but is very limited in nature and thus turns out not to be useful for our applications.) We modify the construction of Gentry and Silverberg [15] to obtain a HIBE that is (HIBE-IND-CPA and) anonymous at level 1. The construction is in the random oracle model and assumes BDH is hard.
PETKS In a PEKS scheme, once the gateway has the trapdoor for a certain keyword, it can test whether this keyword was present in any past ciphertexts or future ciphertexts. It may be useful to limit the period in which the trapdoor can be used. Here we propose an extension of PEKS that we call public-key encryption with temporary keyword search (PETKS) that allows this. A trapdoor here is created for a time interval [s, e] and will only allow the gateway to test whether ciphertexts created in this time interval contain the keyword. We provide definitions of privacy and consistency for PETKS, and then show how to implement it with overhead that is only logarithmic in the total number of time periods. Our construction can use any HIBE that is anonymous at level 1. Using the above-mentioned HIBE we get a particular instantiation that is secure in the randomoracle model if BDH is hard.
IBEKS We define the notion of an identity-based encryption with keyword search scheme. This is just like a PEKS scheme except that encryption is performed given only the identity of the receiver and a master public-key, just like in an IBE scheme. We show how to implement IBEKS given any level-2 anonymous HIBE scheme. The first suitable implementation of the latter primitive was proposed in subsequent work by Boyen and Waters [11] .
Remarks
peks-2-ibe Boneh et al. [8] showed how to transform a PEKS-IND-CPA PEKS scheme into an IBE-IND-CPA IBE scheme. We remark that their transform requires the starting PEKS scheme to be perfectly consistent. Unfortunately, no perfectly consistent PEKS schemes are known to date. If it is only statistically or computationally consistent, the resulting IBE scheme will only meet a corresponding statistical or computational relaxation of the consistency condition for IBE schemes. Thus, the resulting scheme will not be an IBE scheme as per the standard definition of the latter [9] .
Limited PEKS Schemes Boneh et al. [8] also present a couple of PEKS schemes that avoid the RO model but are what they call limited. Both use a standard public-key encryption scheme as a building block. In the first scheme, the public key has size polynomial in the number of keywords that can be used. In the second scheme, the key and ciphertext have size polynomial in the number of trapdoors that can be securely issued to the gateway. Although these schemes are not very interesting due to their limited nature, one could ask about their consistency. In [1] , we extend our definitions of consistency to this limited setting. Interestingly, we show that based on only a computational assumption about the underlying standard public-key encryption scheme (namely, that it is IND-CPA, or even just one-way), the first scheme is statistically consistent. We also show that the second scheme is computationally consistent under the same assumption on the standard public-key encryption scheme, and present a variant that is statistically consistent.
Consistency of Other Searchable Encryption Schemes
Of the other papers on searchable encryption of which we are aware [16, 18, 24, 26] , none formally define or rigorously address the notion of consistency for their respective types of searchable encryption schemes. Goh [16] and Golle, Staddon, and Waters [18] define consistency conditions analogous to BDOP's "perfect consistency" condition, but none of the constructions in [16, 18] satisfy their respective perfect consistency condition. Song, Wagner, and Perrig [24] and Waters et al. [26] do not formally state and prove consistency conditions for their respective searchable encryption schemes, but they, as well as Goh [16] , do acknowledge and informally bound the non-zero probability of a false positive.
Subsequent Work
In a preliminary version of our work, we raised various open problems that have subsequently been solved. The first one of these problems was to find a construction of an (IBE-IND-CPA and) IBE-ANO-CPA IBE scheme with a proof of security in the standard model (i.e., without random oracles). This problem was solved independently by Gentry [14] and by Boyen and Waters [11] . As a result, one can also obtain a PEKS-IND-CPA and computationally consistent PEKS scheme in the standard model due to Theorem 4.2.
Another interesting question that we raised was to find a HIBE scheme providing anonymity at the second level, even in the RO model. This open problem was solved by Boyen and Waters [11] , who proposed a fully anonymous HIBE scheme in the standard model.
Finally, we raised the issue of building a searchable encryption scheme that allows for more advanced searching tools such as searches for simple boolean formulas on keywords (say w 1 ∧ w 2 ∨ w 3 ). First steps in this direction have been taken [10, 18, 22] by schemes that allow for conjunctive combinations of keywords, range queries, and subset queries.
Some Definitions
Notation and Conventions If x is a string then |x| denotes its length, and if S is a set then |S| denotes its size. The empty string is denoted ε. Constructs in the RO model [5] might use multiple random oracles, but since one can always obtain these from a single one [5] , formal definitions will assume just one RO. Unless otherwise indicated, an algorithm may be randomized. "PT" stands for polynomial time and "PTA" for polynomial-time algorithm or adversary. We denote by N the set of positive integers, and by k ∈ N the security parameter. A function ν : N → [0, 1] is said to be negligible if for every c ∈ N there exists a k c ∈ N such that ν(k) ≤ k −c for all k > k c , and it is said to be overwhelming if the function |1 − ν(k)| is negligible. A message space MsgSp is a map, assigning to every k ∈ N a set of strings, such that {0, 1} k ⊆ MsgSp(k) ⊆ {0, 1} * for all k ∈ N and the following conditions hold: first, there is a PTA that on input 1 k , M returns 1 if M ∈ MsgSp(k) and 0 otherwise; second, {0, 1} |M| ⊆ MsgSp(k) for all k ∈ N and M ∈ MsgSp(k).
PEKS A public key encryption with keyword search (PEKS) scheme [8] (sk, w) the receiver computes a trapdoor t w for keyword w and provides it to the gateway; via b ← Test H (t w , C) the gateway tests whether C encrypts w, where b is a bit with 1 meaning "accept" or "yes" and 0 meaning "reject" or "no". Here H is a random oracle whose domain and/or range might depend on k and pk.
Consistency The requirement of [8] can be divided into two parts. The first, which we call right keyword consistency, is that Test(t w , C) always accepts when C encrypts w. More formally, for all k ∈ N and all w ∈ {0, 1} * ,
where the probability is taken over the choice of (pk, sk) $ ← KG(1 k ), the random choice of H , and the coins of all the algorithms in the expression above. Since we will always require this, it is convenient henceforth to take it as an integral part of the PEKS notion and not mention it again, reserving the term "consistency" to only refer to what happens when the ciphertext encrypts a keyword different from the one for which the gateway is testing. In this regard, the requirement of [8] , which we will call perfect consistency, is that Test(t w , C) always reject when C doesn't encrypt w . More formally, for all k ∈ N and all distinct w, w ∈ {0, 1} * ,
where the probability is taken over the choice of (pk, sk) $ ← KG(1 k ), the random choice of H , and the coins of all the algorithms in the expression above. (We note that [8] provide informal rather than formal statements, but it is hard to interpret them in any way other than what we have done.) Privacy Privacy for a PEKS scheme [8] asks that an adversary should not be able to distinguish between the encryption of two challenge keywords of its choice, even if it is allowed to obtain trapdoors for any non-challenge keywords. Formally, we associate to an adversary A and a bit b ∈ {0, 1} the following experiment:
A scheme PEKS is said to be PEKS-IND-CPA-secure if the above advantage is a negligible function in k for all PTAs A.
Parameter Generation Algorithms and the BDH Problem All pairing based schemes will be parameterized by a pairing parameter generator. This is a PTA G that on input 1 k returns the description of an additive cyclic group G 1 of prime order p, where 2 k < p < 2 k+1 , the description of a multiplicative cyclic group G 2 of the same order, and a nondegenerate bilinear pairing e: G 1 × G 1 → G 2 . See [9] for a description of the properties of such pairings. We use G * 1 to denote G 1 \ {0}, i.e. the set of all group elements except the neutral element. We define the advantage of an adversary A in solving the bilinear Diffie-Hellman (BDH) problem relative to a pairing parameter generator G as
We say that the BDH problem is hard relative to this generator if Adv bdh G,A is a negligible function in k for all PTAs A.
Consistency in PEKS
We show that the BDOP -PEKS scheme is not perfectly consistent, introduce new notions of statistical and computational consistency, and show that although BDOP -PEKS continues to fail the former it does meet the latter. We then provide a new PEKS scheme that is statistically consistent. Figure 1 presents the BDOP -PEKS scheme. It is based on a pairing parameter generator G. Proof. Since the number of possible keywords is infinite, there will certainly exist distinct keywords w, w ∈ {0, 1} * such that H 1 (w) = H 1 (w ). The trapdoors for such keywords will be the same, and so
Perfect Consistency of BDOP -PEKS
It is tempting to say that, since H 1 is a random oracle, the probability of a collision is small, and thus the above really does not matter. Whether or not this is true depends on how one wants to define consistency, which is the issue we explore next. 
New Notions of Consistency
We consider a possible relaxation of perfect consistency and argue that it is inadequate because it is too weak. We then motivate and present our approach and definitions. 
A Possible Relaxation of Perfect Consistency
where the probability is taken over the choice of (pk, sk) $ ← KG(1 k ), the random choice of H , and the coins of all the algorithms in the expression above. Now, since we are fixing w, w before taking the probability, and the latter includes the choice of H 1 in the BDOP -PEKS scheme, the probability that H 1 (w) = H 1 (w ) is at most 2 −k . Our "attack" of Proposition 3.1 therefore no longer applies. And in fact (using the techniques of our proof of Theorem 3.3) one can show that the BDOP scheme does meet the above condition. However, (1) is in our view an incorrect definition of consistency because it does not allow w, w to depend on public quantities related to the receiver, such as its public key, the hash functions being used, or queries to them if they are random oracles. Our claim is that, as a result, the condition is too weak to guarantee that email is correctly routed by the gateway.
Our Definitions To define consistency, we take a different approach. Namely, we imagine the existence of an adversary U that wants to make consistency fail. More precisely, let PEKS = (KG, PEKS, Td, Test) be a PEKS scheme. We associate to an adversary U the following experiment:
We define the advantage of U as
where the probability is taken over all possible coin flips of all the algorithms involved, and over all possible choices of random oracle H . The scheme is said to be perfectly consistent if this advantage is 0 for all (computationally unrestricted) adversaries U , statistically consistent if it is negligible for all (computationally unrestricted) adversaries U , and computationally consistent if it is negligible for all PTAs U . We remark that we have purposely re-used the term perfect consistency, for in fact the above notion of perfect consistency coincides with the one from [8] recalled above.
Stronger Notions? In giving the adversary U the public key and access to the random oracle, our definition is already quite liberal. One could however, consider an even more liberal (i.e. stronger) definition in which the adversary gets a trapdoor oracle and/or a test oracle under trapdoors for keywords of its choice. To be able to tell whether or not this would be appropriate, we must ask whether in "real-life" there could be an occasion in which the keywords chosen by a sender could depend on information provided by these oracles. Given that the answer is not cut-and-dry and since we believe that our current definition is already quite strong, we opted here not to consider these stronger variants of our definition.
Statistical and Computational Consistency of BDOP -PEKS
Having formally defined the statistical and computational consistency requirements for PEKS schemes, we return to evaluating the consistency of BDOP -PEKS . We first observe that Proposition 3.1 extends to show:
Proposition 3.2. The BDOP -PEKS scheme is not statistically consistent.
Proof. Recall that in the proof of Proposition 3.1 we show that there exist two distinct keywords w, w ∈ {0, 1} * such that H 1 (w) = H 1 (w ), and that, for these two keywords, Test(Td(sk, w ), PEKS(pk, w)) will always return 1. A computationally unbounded adversary can find two such keywords by exhaustive search.
On the positive side, the following means that BDOP -PEKS is probably fine in practice:
Proof. Let U be a PTA. Let (w, w ) denote the pair of keywords that U returns in the consistency experiment, and assume without loss of generality that w = w . Let r ∈ Z * p denote the value chosen at random by PEKS H 1 ,H 2 (pk, w). Let T = e(H 1 (w), sP ) r and let T = e(H 1 (w ), sP ) r . Note that U wins exactly when w = w and H 2 (T ) = H 2 (T ). Let w 1 , . . . , w q 1 be the queries of U to H 1 and let WSet = {w 1 , . . . ,
denotes the probability in the consistency experiment, then
Our definition of G required that |G 1 | > 2 k , and hence the first and second terms are respectively upper bounded via
Under this claim, the last term of (2) is 0, since if E 1 occurs, then H 1 (w) = H 1 (w ) and T = T , and if E 2 also occurs, then H 2 (T ) = H 2 (T ). To justify our claim above, note that if H 1 (w) = H 1 (w ), then H 1 (w) = αP and H 1 (w ) = α P for some distinct α, α ∈ Z p . Setting g = e(P , P ) rs , we can rewrite T , T as T = g α and T = g α . Since e(P , P ) is a generator of G 2 , since G 2 is of prime order p, and since p does not divide rs, g must also be a generator of G 2 . Thus T = T .
A Statistically Consistent PEKS Scheme
We present the first PEKS scheme that is (PEKS-IND-CPA and) statistically consistent. To define the scheme, we first introduce the function f (k) = k lg(k) . (Any function that is super-polynomial but sub-exponential would suffice. This choice is made for concreteness.) The algorithms constituting our scheme PEKS -STAT are then depicted in Fig. 2 .
The scheme uses ideas from the BDOP -PEKS scheme [8] as well as from the BF -IBE scheme [9] , but adds some new elements. Note that the encryption algorithm is trivial, returning the keyword as the ciphertext, when the keyword has length more than f (k). If not, the processing is more complex, depending on some random choices and numerous random oracles. In particular the random choice of "session" key K, and the fact that the random oracle H 2 is length-increasing, are important.
The first thing we stress about the scheme is that the algorithms are PT. This is because PT means in the length of the inputs, and the input of (say) the encryption algorithm includes w as well as 1 k , so it can test whether |w| ≥ f (k) in polynomial time. Now the following says that the scheme is private:
Proposition 3.4. The PEKS -STAT scheme is PEKS-IND-CPA-secure assuming that the BDH problem is hard relative to generator G.
Before providing the proof, let us give some intuition. While sending w in the clear looks at first glance like it violates privacy, the reason it does not is that this only happens when w has length at least f (k), and the privacy adversary is poly(k) time and thus cannot even write down such a keyword in order to query it to its challenge oracle. (This is where we use the fact that f (k) is super-polynomial. We will use the fact that it is sub-exponential in the proof of statistical consistency.) The privacy adversary is thus effectively restricted to attacking the scheme only on keywords of size at most f (k). Here, privacy can be reduced to solving the BDH problem using techniques used to prove IBE-IND-CPA of the BF -IBE scheme [9] and to prove anonymity of the same scheme (cf. Theorem 4.4). Say it makes at mostueries to its TRAPD(·, ·) oracle and at most q i queries to H i for i = 1, 2, 3. (These are actually functions of k, but we drop the argument to simplify notation.) We construct a PTA A attacking the BDH relative to G such that
Our adversary A is shown in Fig. 3 . We show that A outputs the correct answer T = e(P , P ) rsα with probability at least the quantity on the right-hand-side of (3). Let t (k) be a polynomial which bounds the running time of B. So there is an integer N such that t (k) < f (k) for all k ≥ N . Notice that the PEKS algorithm of the PEKS scheme in Fig. 2 returns w in the clear when |w| ≥ f (k). However, the keywords output by B in the find stage have length at most t (k), so if k ≥ N , the encryption is done by the code for the case |w| < f (k) shown in PEKS. Since it suffices to prove (3) for all k ≥ N , we assume that the encryption is done by the code for the case |w| < f (k) shown in PEKS.
Let Pr 1 [·] denote the probability over the experiment for Adv bdh G,A (k) as defined in Sect. 2. Let E 1 denote the event in this experiment that A aborts in simulating the trapdoor oracle. Let E 2 denote the event that d[w b ] = 0 (which also causes A to abort). Let E 3 denote the event that Q = ∅ (which also causes A to abort). Let E 4 denote the event that B issues a query H 2 (e(rP , sH 1 
denote the probability over Exp
for a random choice for b ∈ {0, 1}, and let b denote the output of B in this experiment. Let E 5 be the event that B issues a query H 2 (e(rP , sH 1 (w b ))) or H 4 (e(rP , sH 1 (w b ))) to its oracles in this experiment. Let E 6 denote the event that B issues a query K w b to its oracle H 3 , where K is the random used in PEKS when replying B's challenge after the find stage. Equation (3) follows from the following claims.
Proof. In the above simulation if none of the events E 1 , E 2 and E 3 happens, then A will randomly choose an element T $ ← Q and return T x[w b ] −1 . However, by definition of event E 4 , one of the elements in Q is equal to e(P , P ) srα·x[w b ] , thus A has at least the probability of 1/|Q| ≥ 1/(q 2 + q 4 ) to give the correct answer to the BDH problem.
Proof. Notice that when event E 4 happens, the set Q must contain at least one element, thus E 3 is always false. Therefore we have Pr 1 
The claim follows by conditioning off of the event ¬E 1 ∧ ¬E 2 .
Proof. Under the condition that A does not abort, the simulation is perfect, i.e. all A's answers to the simulated oracles TRAPD(sk, ·), H 1 (·) . . . H 4 (·) have exactly the same distribution as those in the real PEKS-IND-CPA experiment.
Equation (4) comes from the fact that, by assumption, B makes at most q 3 queries to H 3 . Equation (5) comes from the fact that, if E 5 and E 6 both do not occur, B learns no information from the ciphertext. Rearranging gives
The last equality follows from the standard result that Adv 
The last quantity is maximized at δ = 1/(q + 1) with value at least 1/e(q + 1).
Let us move to the more interesting claim, namely consistency:
Proposition 3.5. The PEKS -STAT scheme is statistically consistent.
Before providing the proof, let us give some intuition. The main issue is that the computationally unbounded consistency adversary U can easily find any collisions that exist for the random-oracle hash functions. Let w, w denote the keywords output by the adversary U . We proceed via a case analysis. One can show that if either w or w have length at least f (k) then Test will not be wrong. The interesting case is when w, w both have length at most f (k). Let (rP , c, t, K 2 ) denote the challenge ciphertext formed by encrypting w. Let T = e(rP , H 1 (w)) and let K = c⊕H 4 (T ) be the underlying session key. Let T = e(rP , H 1 (w )) and let K = c⊕H 4 (T ). Now consider two cases. The first case is that H 1 (w) = H 1 (w ). Properties of pairings imply T = T . Now we claim that this means K 2 = H 2 (T ) = H 2 (T ) with high probability, and thus Test will correctly reject, meaning U does not win. This is not merely because H 2 is random, for remember the adversary is not computationally bounded and can search for, and find, any collisions that exist. The reason is that H 2 is with high probability an injective function and collisions for it simply do not exist. The reason for this is that its domain is G 2 which has size p < 2 k+1 (our definition of a pairing parameter generator required this) but H 2 outputs 3k bits, and thus a union bound can be used to show that H 2 is injective except with probability 4 · 2 −k .
The second case, which is the harder one, is that H 1 (w) = H 1 (w ) (again, we cannot prevent U from finding collisions in H 1 ), and this is where we will use the fact that f (k) is sub-exponential. Here the idea is that at the time it chooses w, w , adversary U does not know the value of the session key K that is randomly chosen later. We divide pairs (V , V ) of strings of length at most f (k) (candidate keywords) into two classes. A pair is heavy if there are "lots" of session keys
, and light otherwise, where "lots" is defined as 2 k/2 . Now we again consider two cases. If (w, w ) is light then the randomly chosen K has only a 2 −k/2 chance of being a session key for which H 3 (K w) = H 3 (K w ) and thus Test will most likely reject, so U does not win. Next we use an occupancy problem based counting argument to show that the probability (over H 3 ) that a particular pair (V , V ) of keywords is heavy is double exponentially small in k. But the number of choices of keyword pairs is 2 O(f (k)) which is sub-double-exponentially small by choice of f (k), and thus a union bound allows us to conclude that (w, w ) is not likely to be heavy.
Suppose BIG holds. If |w | ≥ f (k) then Test(t w , C) will return 1 only if C = w . But this will not be the case because either |w| ≥ f (k) and C = w = w , or |w| < f (k) and, for large enough k, |C| < f (k) ≤ |w |. On the other hand if |w| ≥ f (k) and |w | < f (k) then C = w and the latter cannot be parsed as an appropriate 4-tuple (rP , c, t, K 2 ), so Test will return 0. We conclude that Pr[BAD | BIG] = 0 for all large enough k. We now want to bound
We bound p 1 , p 2 in turn. We let S be the set of all distinct pairs (g, g ) of elements in G 1 . So p 1 is at most the sum, over all (g, g ) ∈ S, of the product terms
Properties of pairings tell us that g = g implies e(rP , g) = e(rP , g ). So due to the randomness of H 2 , the first term of each product above is 2 −3k . However, there are at most p 2 choices for the pair (g, g ), and we know that p < 2 k+1 . Thus we have
(As we discussed above, the intuition here is that with probability at least 1 − 4 · 2 −k the function H 2 is injective.) We now proceed to bound p 2 . In this argument, we regard H 1 as fixed. (Formally, imagine that we condition on a particular choice of H 1 . This suffices since what follows holds for all values of this choice.) Let U be the set of all pairs (V , V ) of distinct keywords of length at most f (k) each such that
We say that (V , V ) is heavy if |Keys(V , V )| ≥ 2 k/2 , and light otherwise. We let Lt(V , V ) denote the event that (V , V ) is light and Hw(V , V ) the event that (V , V ) is heavy, where the probability is over the choice of
We bound these in turn. We have
Equation (6) is justified by the definition of the Test, the fact that K is chosen at random from {0, 1} k and the fact that (V , V ) is light. Now we turn to bounding p H .
Claim. For any
where the probability is only over the choice of H 3 .
Note the bound of the claim is double-exponentially small. We prove the claim later. Using it we can conclude via the union bound:
where
Proof of Claim. We use an occupancy problem approach:
Let x = e2 −k/2 . For k ≥ 6, we have x ≤ 1/2. So the above is at most
as desired.
PEKS and Anonymous IBE
We formally define anonymity of IBE schemes and investigate the relation between PEKS and anonymous IBE. 
, where the probability is taken over the choice of (pk, msk) $ ← Setup(1 k ), the random choice of H , and the coins of all the algorithms in the expression above.
Privacy and Anonymity Privacy (IBE-IND-CPA) follows [9] while anonymity (IBE-ANO-CPA) is a straightforward adaptation of [3] to IBE schemes. Let IBE = (Setup, KeyDer, Enc, Dec) be an IBE scheme with associated message space MsgSp.
To an adversary A and bit b ∈ {0, 1}, we associate the following experiments:
where the oracle KEYDER(id) is defined as
For prop ∈ {ind, ano}, we define the advantage of A in the corresponding experiment as
IBE scheme IBE is said to be IBE-IND-CPA-secure (resp., IBE-ANO-CPA-secure) if the respective advantage function is negligible for all PTAs A.
parse pk as (pk, R) 
The ibe-2-peks Transform
The ibe-2-peks transform suggested in [8] takes input an IBE scheme IBE = (Setup, KeyDer, Enc, Dec) and returns a PEKS scheme PEKS = (KG, Td, PEKS, Test) as follows. The public key pk and secret key sk of the receiver in the PEKS scheme are the master public and secret keys, respectively, of the IBE scheme (i.e., KG = Setup). The trapdoor t w associated to keyword w is the secret key that the IBE scheme would assign to the identity w (i.e., Td(sk, w) = KeyDer(sk, w)). A keyword w is PEKS-encrypted by IBE-encrypting the message 0 k for the identity w (i.e., PEKS(pk, w) = Enc(pk, w, 0 k )). Finally, testing is done by checking that the ciphertext decrypts to 0 k (i.e., Test(t w , C) returns 1 iff Dec(t w , C) = 0 k ). We know that BF -IBE is anonymous (Theorem 4.4), that BDOP -PEKS = ibe-2-peks(BF -IBE), and that BDOP -PEKS is not statistically consistent (Proposition 3.2). Thus, we can conclude that the ibe-2-peks transform does not necessarily yield a statistically consistent PEKS scheme. Unfortunately, as the following theorem shows, the ibe-2-peks transform does not necessarily yield a computationally consistent PEKS scheme either (under the minimal assumption of the existence of some IBE-IND-CPAand IBE-ANO-CPA-secure IBE scheme). As a result, ibe-2-peks is not in general a suitable way to obtain a PEKS scheme. Proof (Sketch). The proof of Theorem 4.1 is quite simple and its details are omitted here. Instead, we only provide the general intuition behind it. In order to show that ibe-2-peks does not necessarily yield a computationally consistent PEKS scheme, we first assume the existence of a IBE-IND-CPA-and IBE-ANO-CPA-secure IBE scheme IBE = (Setup, KeyDer, Enc, Dec) and then build an IBE scheme IBE = (Setup, KeyDer, Enc, Dec) as shown in Fig. 4 . It is easy to see that the IBE-IND-CPA-and IBE-ANO-CPA-security of IBE follows from simple reductions from the security of IBE . Now, let PEKS denote the PEKS scheme outputted by ibe-2-peks on input IBE. Clearly, PEKS is not computationally consistent as its test algorithm outputs 1 with overwhelming probability, when given the trapdoor for the wrong keyword. The only case in which it outputs 0 when given the wrong trapdoor is when the last k bits of the decryption of the ciphertext C with the wrong trapdoor matches the random value R in the public key pk, but this only happens with negligible probability due to the IBE-IND-CPA security of the IBE scheme IBE.
The new-ibe-2-peks Transform
The negative result in Theorem 4.1 raises the question: Does the existence of IBE schemes imply the existence of computationally consistent PEKS schemes? We answer that in the affirmative by presenting a revision of the ibe-2-peks transform, called new-ibe-2-peks, that transforms any IBE-IND-CPA-and IBE-ANO-CPA-secure IBE scheme into a PEKS-IND-CPA-secure and computationally consistent PEKS scheme. It is similar to ibe-2-peks except that instead of always using 0 k as the message encrypted, the PEKS-encryption algorithm chooses and encrypts a random message R and appends R in the clear to the ciphertext. In more detail, the new-ibe-2-peks transform takes input an IBE scheme IBE = (Setup, KeyDer, Enc, Dec) and returns a PEKS scheme PEKS = (KG, Td, PEKS, Test) as follows. The public key pk and secret key sk of the receiver in the PEKS scheme are the master public and secret keys, respectively, of the IBE scheme. (I.e. KG = Setup.) The trapdoor associated to keyword w is the secret key that the IBE scheme would assign to the identity w. Intuitively, this construction avoids the problem of oddly-behaving Dec algorithms by making sure that the only way to ruin the consistency of the PEKS scheme is by correctly guessing the value encrypted by a ciphertext, using the secret key of a different identity, which should not be possible for an IBE-IND-CPA-secure IBE scheme. Hence, the consistency of the resulting PEKS scheme is due to the data privacy property of the IBE scheme, while the data privacy property of the PEKS scheme comes from the anonymity of the IBE scheme. The formal result statement and proof follow.
Theorem 4.2. Let IBE be an IBE scheme and let PEKS be the PEKS scheme derived from IBE via new-ibe-2-peks. If IBE is IBE-IND-CPA-secure, then PEKS is computationally consistent. Further, if IBE is IBE-ANO-CPA-secure, then PEKS is PEKS-IND-CPA-secure.
Proof. Let U be any PTA attacking the computational consistency of PEKS , and consider the following PTA A attacking the IBE-IND-CPA-security of IBE. In its find stage, given master public key pk, adversary A runs U(pk) to get keywords w, w . It returns w as the challenge identity and R 0 , R 1 $ ← {0, 1} k as the challenge messages. In the guess stage, given challenge ciphertext C (that encrypts R b under identity w for challenge bit b ∈ {0, 1}), A uses its key-derivation oracle to obtain a trapdoor t w for w . If Dec(t w , C) = R 1 then it returns 1 else it returns 0. It is easy to see that
Thus Adv
(k)+2 −k , proving the first claim of the theorem. Let B be any PTA attacking the PEKS-IND-CPA-security of PEKS , and consider the following PTA A attacking the IBE-ANO-CPA-security of IBE . In its find stage, given master public key pk, adversary A runs B(find, pk) to get challenge keywords w 0 , w 1 , which it returns along with a message R $ ← {0, 1} k . In the guess stage, given challenge ciphertext C (that encrypts R under identity w b for challenge bit b ∈ {0, 1}), A runs B, in its guess stage, with challenge ciphertext (C, R), to get its guess bit b , which A returns. In both stages, A answers any trapdoor-oracle queries of B via its key-derivation oracle. It is easy to see that for b = 0, 1,
(k), proving the second claim of the theorem.
A Sufficient Condition for Anonymity
Halevi [19] provides a simple sufficient condition for an IND-CPA public-key encryption scheme to meet the notion of anonymity (a.k.a. key-privacy) of [3] . The condition is that even a computationally unbounded adversary, given public keys pk 0 , pk 1 and the encryption of a random message under pk b , have only a negligible advantage in determining the random challenge bit b. Towards finding anonymous IBE schemes (a task motivated by Theorem 4.2) we extend Halevi's condition to identity-based encryption. In the process we also extend it in two other ways: first to handle the random oracle model (the standard model is a special case) and second to weaken the statistical (i.e. information-theoretic) requirement of [19] to a computational one. (The application of this paper does not need the last extension, but it may be useful in other contexts.)
We begin by defining a relevant (new) notion of security that we call IBE-ANO-RE-CPA. Let IBE = (Setup, KeyDer, Enc, Dec) be an IBE scheme with associated message space MsgSp. We associate to an adversary A and bit b ∈ {0, 1} the following experiment:
The IBE-ANO-RE-CPA-advantage of an adversary A in violating the anonymity of the scheme IBE is defined as
A scheme IBE is said to be IBE-ANO-RE-CPA-secure if the above advantage is a negligible function in k for all PTAs A.
Lemma 4.3. Let IBE be an IBE scheme that is IBE-IND-CPA and IBE-ANO-RE-CPA-secure. Then it is also IBE-ANO-CPA-secure.
Proof of Lemma 4.3. The proof is a simple hybrid argument. Let A be a PTA attacking the IBE-ANO-CPA-security of IBE . It is easy to construct PTAs A 1 , A 3 attacking the IBE-IND-CPA-security of IBE , and PTA A 2 attacking the IBE-ANO-RE-CPAsecurity of IBE , such that
Summing concludes the proof. We omit the details, save to remark that we use here the second convention about message spaces noted in Sect. 2.
Anonymity of BF -IBE
The Boneh-Franklin BasicIdent IBE scheme [9] is shown in Fig. 5 . We apply Lemma 4.3 to give a simple proof that it is IBE-ANO-CPA.
Theorem 4.4. The BF -IBE scheme is IBE-ANO-CPA-secure assuming that the BDH is hard relative to generator G.
Proof. Given Lemma 4.3, and given that the BF -IBE scheme is IBE-IND-CPA-secure [9] , it suffices to show that the scheme is IBE-ANO-RE-CPA-secure. Notice that the ciphertext C in Fig. 5 5 . Algorithms of the IBE scheme BF -IBE = (Setup, KeyDer, Enc, Dec). Here G is a pairing parameter generator and H 1 : {0, 1} * → G * 1 and H 2 : G 2 → {0, 1} k are random oracles. The message space is defined by
has two parts, namely U = rP and V = M ⊕ H 2 (T ). The value
U is chosen uniformly at random from G * 1 by the encryption algorithm. If the message M is chosen uniformly at random from {0, 1} k , then V is also uniformly distributed in {0, 1} k and independent of the H 2 (T ). Thus in both the 0-and 1-worlds of the IBE-ANO-RE-CPA-security game, the challenge ciphertext C has exactly the same distribution. Therefore any adversary against IBE-ANO-RE-CPA-security will have 0 advantage.
Anonymous HIBE

Definitions
HIBE Schemes A hierarchical identity-based encryption (HIBE) scheme [7, 15, 20] is a generalization of an IBE scheme in which an identity is a vector of strings id = (id 1 , . . . , id l ) with the understanding that when l = 0 this is the empty vector (). The number of components in this vector is called the level of the identity and is denoted |id|. If 0 ≤ i ≤ l then id| i = (id 1 , . . . , id i ) denotes the vector containing the first i components of id. If |id | ≥ l + 1 (l ≥ 0) and id | l = id then we say that id is an ancestor of id , or equivalently, that id is a descendant of id. If the level of id is l + 1 then id is a parent of id , or, equivalently, id is a child of id. For any id with |id| ≥ 1 we let par(id) = id| |id|−1 denote its parent. Two nodes id = (id 1 , . . . , id l ) and id = (id 1 , . . . , id l ) at level l are said to be siblings iff id| l−1 = id | l−1 . Moreover, if id l < id l in lexicographic order, then id is a left sibling of id and id is a right sibling of id. An identity at level one or more can be issued a secret key by its parent. (And thus an identity can issue keys for any of its descendants if necessary.)
Formally a HIBE scheme HIBE = (Setup, KeyDer, Enc, Dec) consists of four PTAs.
where k ∈ N is a security parameter, the root generates master keys, with the secret key being associated to the (unique) identity () at level 0. (usk[id] , C) the identity id decrypts ciphertext C to get back a message. Here H is a random oracle with domain and range possibly depending on k and pk. Associated to the scheme is a message space MsgSp obeying the conventions discussed in Sect. 2. For consistency, we require that for all k ∈ N, all identities id with |id| ≥ 1 and all messages M ∈ MsgSp(k),
where the probability is taken over the choice of (pk, usk[()]) $ ← Setup(1 k ), the random choice of H , and the coins of all the algorithms in the expression above.
Privacy and Anonymity
The notion of privacy for HIBE schemes is analogous to that for IBE schemes (IBE-IND-CPA) but using identity vectors rather than identity strings and where the adversary is not allowed to query the KEYDER oracle for the secret key of any ancestor of the identity under attack. Since we will deal with schemes where privacy holds only up to some level, the notion is parameterized by a maximum depth function d : N → N, and all identities id (in queries or challenges) must have |id| ≤ d(k). To allow a fine-grained treatment of anonymity we introduce the concept of anonymity at a set L(k) of levels, meaning that in an experiment the adversary A is challenged to distinguish two distinct identities differing only at levels l ∈ L(k). (Here for each k, L(k) is a finite set of integers. For ease of notation, we will write l rather than {l} when L(k) = {l} is a singleton set.)
Formally, let HIBE = (Setup, KeyDer, Enc, Dec) be an identity-based encryption scheme with message space MsgSp, let d : N → N be the maximum depth, and let L be a set of levels. Let diff(· , ·) be the function that returns the set of coordinates at which the input identities differ, and anc(·) the function returning the set of ancestors of the input identity. To any bit b ∈ {0, 1} and any adversary A, we associate the experiments:
where the oracle KEYDER(·) is defined as
We define the advantage of A in the corresponding experiments as Experiment Exp
]-advantage of an adversary A in violating the level-L anonymity of the scheme HIBE with depth d(k) is defined as
A scheme HIBE is said to be HIBE-ANO-RE-CPA 
Construction
The HIBE scheme of [20] appears to be anonymous, but supports only two levels of identities, and is only resistant against limited collusions at the second level, and hence is not usable for our constructions that follow. Since the HIBE of [15] , here denoted GS -HIBE , is equivalent to the Boneh-Franklin IBE scheme [9] when restricted to the first level, and since the latter is provably anonymous as per Theorem 4.4, one could hope that GS -HIBE is level-1 anonymous, but this turns out not to be true, and the HIBE of [7] is not level-1 anonymous either. To see why, consider the following. The GS -HIBE encryption of a message M under identity id
where H 1 , H 2 are random oracles, P is a generator of a pairing group that is part of pk, and r is chosen at random from Z p by the encryption algorithm. Anonymity is violated because an adversary can decide whether a given ciphertext
The lack of anonymity in GS -HIBE stems from the fact that the hashes in the first l components of the ciphertext depend on the first component of the recipient's identity. In Fig. 6 , we present a modified mGS -HIBE scheme that uses a different random oracle H 1,l for each level l, and that computes ciphertexts as , H 1,1 (id 1 )) ) ⊕ m .
The following implies in particular that mGS -HIBE is the first full HIBE scheme providing anonymity at any level. The restriction on d is inherited from [15] . We note that, subsequently to our work, Boyen and Waters [11] proposed a HIBE scheme that is anonymous at all levels in the standard (i.e., non-random-oracle) model.
Theorem 5.2. For any d(k) = O(log(k)), the mGS -HIBE scheme is HIBE-ANO-CPA[1, d]-secure and HIBE-IND-CPA[d]-secure in the random oracle model assuming the BDH problem is hard relative to the generator G.
We split up the proof in the following two lemmas. The proof of the first is given in Appendix B, and recycles ideas from [9, 15] . We use Lemma 5.1 to prove the second lemma. O(log(k) ), the mGS -HIBE scheme is HIBE-ANO-CPA [1, d] -secure in the random oracle model assuming the BDH problem is hard relative to the generator G.
Lemma 5.3. For any d(k) = O(log(k)), the mGS -HIBE scheme is HIBE-IND-CPA[d]-secure in the random oracle model assuming the BDH problem is hard relative to the generator G.
Lemma 5.4. For any d(k) =
KeyDer H 1,1 ,...,H 1,l (usk, id) parse 1,1 (id 1 ), Q 0 ) ) . . , C * l+1 ), the first component C 1 is chosen uniformly at random from G * 1 . Component C * i for 2 ≤ i ≤ l is uniquely defined by C * 1 and the i-th component of the identity, which is the same for both challenge identities since they can only differ at level 1. Finally, if the message M is chosen uniformly at random from {0, 1} k , then the last component C * l+1 is also uniformly distributed over {0, 1} k , independent of H 2 (e (rH 1,1 (id 1 ), Q 0 ) ). Hence, the challenge ciphertext is identically distributed in both worlds, and the advantage of any adversary is 0.
Public-Key Encryption with Temporary Keyword Search
In a PEKS scheme, once the gateway has the trapdoor for a certain keyword, it can test whether this keyword was present in past ciphertexts, and can test its presence in any future ciphertexts. It may be useful to limit the period in which the trapdoor can be used. Here we propose an extension of PEKS that allows this. We call it public-key encryption with temporary keyword search (PETKS) or temporarily searchable encryption for short. A trapdoor here is created for a time interval [s, e] and will only allow the gateway to test whether ciphertexts created in this time interval contain the keyword. 
≤ N(k) − 1, and provides it to the gateway; via b ← Test H (t w , C) the gateway tests whether C encrypts w, where b is a bit with 1 meaning "accept" or "yes" and 0 meaning "reject" or "no". Here H is a random oracle whose domain and/or range might depend on k and pk. We require that for all k ∈ N, all s, e, i with 0 ≤ s ≤ i ≤ e ≤ N(k) − 1, and all w ∈ {0, 1} * ,
where the probability is taken over the choice of (pk, sk) $ ← KG(1 k ), the random choice of H , and the coins of all the algorithms in the expression above.
Consistency Consistency for PETKS schemes requires that no user U can output keywords w, w and time period indices s, e, i ∈ [1, N(k) −1] 
petks-consist
PETKS,U (k) as the probability that U succeeds in doing so. Just like for standard PEKS schemes, we distinguish between perfect, statistical and computational consistency.
Privacy Privacy for a PETKS scheme asks that an adversary be unable to distinguish between the encryption of two challenge keywords of its choice in a time period i ∈ [0, N(k) − 1] of its choice, even if it is allowed not only to obtain trapdoors for nonchallenge keywords issued for any time interval, but also is allowed to obtain trapdoors for any keywords (even the challenge ones), issued for time intervals not containing i. The formal experiment and the definition of PETKS-IND-CPA-advantage and security are otherwise analogous to those of standard PEKS schemes, and hence are omitted here.
Constructions for PETKS Schemes
Constructions with Linear Complexity PETKS is reminiscent of forward-security [4, 12] , and, as in these works, there are straightforward solutions with keys or trapdoors of length linear in N(k). One such solution is to use a standard PEKS scheme and generate a different key pair (pk i , sk i ) for each time period i ∈ [0, N(k) − 1]. Let pk = (pk 0 , . . . , pk N(k)−1 ) be the PETKS public key and sk = (sk 0 , . . . , sk N(k)−1 ) be the PETKS secret key. During time period i, the sender encrypts a keyword w by encrypting w under pk i using the PEKS scheme. The trapdoor for a keyword w in the interval [s, e] consists of all PEKS trapdoors for w of periods s, . . . , e. A somewhat more efficient solution is to let the PETKS master key pair be a single key pair for the standard PEKS scheme, and append the time period to the keyword (making sure that the string is uniquely decodable, e.g. by using a special separator symbol) when encrypting or computing trapdoors. This scheme achieves short public and secret keys, but still has trapdoor length linear in N(k), because the PETKS trapdoor still contains PEKS trapdoors for all time periods s, . . . , e. Note that both these construction only work for polynomially bounded N(k).
The hibe-2-petks transform We now present a transformation hibe-2-petks of a HIBE scheme into a PETKS scheme that yields a PETKS scheme with complexity logarithmic in N(k) for all parameters. The construction is very similar to the generic construction of forward-secure encryption from binary-tree encryption [12] . The number of time periods is N(k) = 2 t (k) for some polynomially bounded function t : N → N .  If i ∈ [0, N(k) − 1], then let i 1 , . . . , i t (k) denote its binary representation as a t (k)-bit string. Intuitively, our construction instantiates a HIBE of depth t (k) + 1 with keywords as the first level of the identity tree and the time structure on the lower levels. The trapdoor for keyword w and interval of time periods [s, e] consists of the user secret keys of all identities from (w, s 1 , . . . , s t (k) ) to (w, e 1 , . . . , e t (k) ), but taking advantage of the hierarchical structure to include entire subtrees of keys.
More precisely, let HIBE = (Setup, KeyDer, Enc, Dec) be a HIBE scheme. Then we associate to it a PETKS scheme PETKS = hibe-2-petks( 
We split the proof of the theorem over the following two lemmas.
Lemma 6.2. Let HIBE be a HIBE scheme, and let PETKS = hibe-2-petks(HIBE , t (k))
for some polynomially bounded function t :
Proof. Let HIBE = (Setup, KeyDer, Enc, Dec) be a level-1 anonymous (HIBE-ANO-CPA[1, t (k) + 1]-secure) HIBE scheme, and let PETKS = hibe-2-petks(HIBE , t (k)) = (KG, Td, PETKS, Test, N) be the associated PETKS scheme. Given an adversary A breaking the PETKS-IND-CPA security of PETKS , we construct an adversary B breaking the HIBE-ANO-CPA[1, t (k) + 1] security of HIBE as follows. On input public parameters pk, B runs A on inputs (find, pk). When A queries its TRAPD oracle for the trapdoor of keyword w for interval [s, e] , then B constructs a set T exactly as the Td algorithm does, and constructs the corresponding trapdoor by querying its KEYDER oracle for the user secret keys corresponding to all identities in T .
When A outputs challenge keywords w 0 , w 1 and time period i, B outputs challenge identities id 0 = (w 0 , i 1 , . . . , i t (k) ), id 1 = (w 1 , i 1 , . . . , i t (k) ) and a randomly chosen message M of length k. Note that identities id 0 and id 1 differ on level 1, but are otherwise equal, as required for level-1 anonymity. Upon receiving challenge ciphertext C, adversary B sends (i, R, C) to A and runs it until A outputs a bit b (responding to A's oracle queries the same way as before). Adversary B outputs the same bit b .
It is easy to see that, due to the ordered structure of the time tree, adversary B does not need to corrupt any ancestors of its challenge identities. Therefore, adversary B succeeds whenever A does, and we have Complexity Since the mGS -HIBE has user secret keys and ciphertexts of size linear in the depth of the tree, our resulting PETKS scheme has public and secret keys of size O(1), ciphertexts of size O(log N(k)) and trapdoors of size O(log 2 N(k)). We note that in this case a user can decrypt ciphertexts intended for any of its descendants directly, without needing to derive the corresponding secret key first. This makes the call to the KeyDer algorithm in the Test algorithm superfluous, thereby improving the efficiency of Test. Note that since the mGS -HIBE scheme is only secure for tree depths O(log(k) ), the derived PETKS scheme is restricted to a polynomial number of time periods.
Unbounded Time Periods Using the techniques of [21] , one can create a variant of our scheme with efficiency depending on the number of elapsed time periods, rather than the maximal number of time periods N(k). This means that there is no efficiency penalty for overestimating N(k), so that a sufficiently high value can be chosen when setting up the system. However, for security reasons the number of time periods remains limited to a maximum of
is the maximum depth of the underlying HIBE scheme.
Identity-Based Encryption with Keyword Search
In this section, we show how to combine the concepts of identity-based encryption and PEKS to obtain identity-based encryption with keyword search (IBEKS) or ID-based searchable encryption for short. Like in IBE schemes, this allows to use any string as a recipient's public key for the PEKS scheme. (usk[id] , w), the receiver computes a trapdoor t w for keyword w and identity id and provides it to the gateway; via b ← Test H (t w , C) , the gateway tests whether C encrypts w, where b is a bit with 1 meaning "accept" or "yes" and 0 meaning "reject" or "no". As usual H is a random oracle whose domain and/or range might depend on k and pk. For correctness, we require that for all k ∈ N, all identities id, and all w ∈ {0, 1} * ,
where the probability is taken over the choice of (pk, msk) $ ← Setup(1 k ), the random choice of H , and the coins of all algorithms in the expression above.
Consistency The notion of consistency for IBEKS is similar to the one given for PEKS. The advantage of a user U is defined as the probability that, on input the master public key pk, it can output keywords w, w and identities id, id such that w = w or id = id , yet still an encryption of w under identity id tests positively under a trapdoor derived for keyword w and identity id . We again distinguish between perfect, statistical and computational consistency. Note that this definition also considers it a consistency problem if a trapdoor for identity id tests positively for a ciphertext intended for identity id = id . This type of problems is easily avoided by having the KeyDer, Td and IBEKS algorithms include the intended identity into the user secret keys, trapdoors and ciphertexts, respectively.
Privacy We define privacy for IBEKS schemes says that an adversary should not be able to distinguish between the encryption of two different challenge keywords w 0 , w 1 of its choice for any identity id of its choice. Moreover, this should be the case even if the adversary is allowed to obtain trapdoors for non-challenge keywords issued for any identity and to obtain trapdoors for w 0 , w 1 for identities other than id. The advantage function Adv ibeks-ind-cpa IBEKS,A (k) of an adversary A and the notion of IBEKS-IND-CPA security are defined analogously to standard PEKS schemes.
A Generic Transformation from Anonymous HIBE Schemes
We now propose a generic transform, called hibe-2-ibeks, to convert any HIBE scheme with two levels into an IBEKS scheme. To obtain an IBEKS that is IBEKS-IND-CPAsecure, it is sufficient to start with a HIBE that is anonymous at level 2. Moreover, if the underlying HIBE is HIBE-IND-CPA [2] -secure, then the resulting IBEKS is also computationally consistent.
The hibe-2-ibeks Transform Given a HIBE scheme HIBE = (Setup, KeyDer, Enc, Dec) with two levels, hibe-2-ibeks returns the IBEKS scheme IBEKS = (Setup, KeyDer, IBEKS, Td, Test) such that KeyDer(msk, id) = (usk, id) where usk 
Proof.
Given an adversary A breaking the IBEKS-IND-CPA-security of IBEKS , we construct an HIBE-ANO-CPA[2, 2]-adversary B breaking HIBE as follows. On input a public key pk, algorithm B runs A on the same input, answering A's KEYDER(·) queries by forwarding the output of its own KEYDER(·) oracle, and answering A's TRAPD(id, w) oracle queries by querying its own KEYDER(·) oracle for the secret key corresponding to identity (id, w). When A outputs a challenge identity id and two challenge keywords w 0 , w 1 , adversary B chooses a random message M ∈ {0, 1} k and outputs M as the challenge message and id 0 = (id , w 0 ) and id 1 = (id , w 1 ) as the challenge identities, which in fact differ only in the second entry. Let C be the challenge ciphertext that B receives at the beginning of its guess phase. Adversary B returns (M , C ) to A, and continues to run A (answering TRAPD queries the same way as before) until it outputs a bit b . Algorithm B then outputs the same bit b as its own output.
It is clear from the construction that B's simulation of A's environment is perfect. Since A cannot query its TRAPD oracle on keywords (id , w 0 ) and (id , w 1 ), B will not be forced to query its KEYDER on identities id 0 and id 1 , and hence wins the game whenever A does. Therefore, we have that
Concrete Instantiations
Neither the GS -HIBE scheme of [15] nor the mGS -HIBE scheme of Fig. 6 are anonymous at the second level. For the GS -HIBE scheme, consider an adversary A who outputs challenge identities id = (id 1 , id 2 ) and id = (id 1 , id 2 ) for any id 1 , id 2 , id 2 ∈ {0, 1} * such that id 2 = id 2 , and any challenge message M ∈ {0, 1} k . When given the challenge ciphertext C = (C 1 , C 2 , C 3 ), A checks whether e(C 1 , H 1 (id) ) = e(P , C 2 ). (See (7) for how ciphertexts are created in the GS -HIBE scheme.) If the test succeeds, then A returns 0, otherwise it returns 1. It is easy to see that the advantage of A is Adv
A similar attack can be mounted on the mGS -HIBE scheme by checking whether e(C 1 , H 1,2 (id 2 )) = e(P , C 2 ).
In Appendix A.3, we show that the recently introduced HIBE scheme by Boneh et al. [7] is not level-2 anonymous either (and actually, not anonymous at any level). Subsequent to our work, Boyen and Waters [11] proposed a fully anonymous HIBE scheme that, when used to instantiate our generic construction, immediately yields an IBEKS scheme with security and consistency in the standard model.
Identity-Based Encryption with Temporary Keyword Search
The ideas of Sects. 6 and 7 can be further combined to create an identity-based encryption scheme with temporary keyword search. This can be constructed from a level-2 anonymous HIBE scheme by putting the users' identities at the first level of the hierarchy, the keywords at the second, and a binary tree of time frames on the levels below. collision-resistant hash function), which are written as id = id [1] id [2] . .
(We drop the argument k to n when k is understood.) The message space is defined by MsgSp(k) = {0, 1} k , and messages are encoded as elements of G 2 in the scheme. We now describe a PTA A against the IBE-ANO-CPA-security of W -IBE. In the find stage it gets input a public key (G 1 , G 2 , p, e, P , P 1 , U , E), and returns any two distinct n-bit strings id 0 , id 1 as challenge identities, along with any k-bit challenge message. In the guess phase, given a challenge ciphertext C = (C 1 , C 2 , C 3 ) formed by encrypting M under id b , where b ∈ {0, 1} is the challenge bit, it computes
. If e(P , C 3 ) = e(C 2 , V ) then it returns 1 else it returns 0. It is easy to see that Adv ibe-ano-cpa
A.2. Boneh-Boyen's IBE Scheme
The IBE scheme by Boneh and Boyen [6] , here referred to as BB-IBE , is depicted in Fig. 8 . An identity is represented by a vector of n(k) symbols id [1, . . . , n] ∈ n where is an alphabet of size s. In the original scheme, these are obtained as the output of an admissible hash function, but we ignore this here as it is irrelevant to the attack.
Consider a PTA A that, on input pk = (G 1 , G 2 , p, e, P , P 1 , Q, U ), outputs any two distinct identities id 0 , id 1 ∈ n , and any message M ∈ {0, 1} k . Let i ∈ {1, . . . , n} be an index so that id 0 C i+2 ) . If so, then A returns 0, else it returns 1. It is easily verified that Adv ibe-ano-cpa
A.3. Boneh-Boyen-Goh's HIBE Scheme
The recently proposed BBG-HIBE scheme [7] , depicted in Fig. 9 , is not anonymous at any single level, and therefore not at any set of multiple levels either. This can be seen from the following adversary A that breaks the anonymity at level l. On input pk = (G 1 , G 2 , p, e, P , P 1 , Q, Q 2 , U ), adversary A outputs challenge identities We first show that our simulator B provides a real attack environment for A as long as B doesn't abort. The public key pk given to A is correctly distributed because the challenge elements aP , bP , cP are random elements from G * 1 . The responses to H 1,i queries are uniformly distributed over G * 1 due to the independent random choices of x i (when simulating queries H 1,i (id i ), id i = id * i , 1 ≤ i ≤ d(k)), of x * i (which is used to simulate H 1,i (id * i ) queries, 2 ≤ i ≤ d(k)) and due to the uniform distribution of aP (which is used to simulate H 1,1 (id * 1 )). Responses to H 2 queries are easily seen to be correctly distributed. The way KEYDER queries are handled requires a bit more explanation. For all level-1 identities id 1 = id * 1 , the returned secret key (S 1 , s 1 ) contains the unique group element S 1 such that e(Q 0 , H 1,1 (id 1 )) = e(S 1 , P ) and a uniformly distributed scalar s 1 , as in the real game. For all descendants of id 1 = id * 1 , the secret keys are derived from (S 1 , s 1 ) exactly as in the real scheme. Now consider identity (id * . Given that ¬Ask i−1 and that B's simulation didn't abort, the simulated public key, the oracle responses and the first l components of the ciphertext provided by B are distributed exactly as in a real attack, as we explained before. Moreover, since A did not query for H 2 (D) yet, from A's point of view the last ciphertext component C * l+1 is a random string in {0, 1} n , both in the real attack and in the simulated environment. Since all the information on which A can base its decision for its next H 2 query is identically distributed in both environments, the probability that A chooses to query D is the same in both environments as well. Hence 
; the probability that B guesses the correct H 2 query is 1/n 2 ≥ n −1 h ; and the probability that B aborts when answering H 1,i queries is 
